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According to retrospective voting a bad economy hurts the incumbent
party and vice versa. According to risk-aversion voting a bad economy favors
the Democrats over the Republicans and vice versa. This paper provides a
test of both theories and rejects risk-aversion voting.
1 Introduction
There is strong evidence that the state of the economy has an effect on voting
behavior. In my voting equation for the United States1 the Democratic share of the
two-party vote for president depends on inflation and output variables plus some
incumbency variables. A good economy favors the incumbent party, and vice
versa. The voting behavior that is reflected in this equation is sometimes called
“retrospective” voting, which will be used here.
In a recent paper Pástor and Veronesi (2020) (PV) argue that another aspect
of voting behavior is what they call “risk-aversion” voting. The idea is that when
risk aversion is high, people tend to vote more for Democrats, and vice versa. PV
∗Cowles Foundation, Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8281.
e-mail: ray.fair@yale.edu; website: fairmodel.econ.yale.edu.
1The latest published paper on this work is Fair (2009). The latest version of the equation is on
my website. Fair (1996) contains a discussion of the history of the equation.
argue that risk aversion is high when the economy is doing poorly, so, other things
being equal, a bad economy favors the Democrats. Retrospective theory says this
is true only if the Republicans are in power. If the Democrats are in power a bad
economy hurts their chances. PV also argue that risk aversion is low when the
economy is doing well, which favors the Republicans. Again, retrospective theory
says this is true only if the Republicans are in power. The two theories thus agree
when the Republicans are in power, but not when the Democrats are.
The risk-aversion theory is straightforward to test using my voting equation. Let
Gt denote the growth rate of real per capita GDP in the first three quarters of election
year t, which is the growth variable in the equation. Since the dependent variable is
the Democratic vote share, the growth variable enters the equation as GtIt, where
It is 1 if there is a Democratic incumbent and -1 if there is a Republican incumbent.
Retrospective theory says this variable should have a positive coefficient estimate.
Risk-aversion theory ignores who is in power and simply postulates that a large
growth rate benefits the Republicans and a low growth rate benefits the Democrats.
In other words, the theory argues that Gt should be the growth variable, not Gt
multiplied by It. In practice both effects may be operating, and this can be tested
by simply adding both GtIt and Gt to the equation. If there is risk-aversion voting,
the coefficient estimate of Gt should be negative and significant. For example,
when Gt is high and the Democrats are in power, there should be some positive
effect fromGtIt because of retrospective voting, but also some negative effect from
Gt because of risk-aversion voting. It will be seen that the coefficient estimate of
Gt is positive, contrary to the risk-aversion theory, and not significant. The results
thus do not support risk-aversion voting.
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2 The Equation
The equation will only be briefly outlined here. A complete discussion is in
Fair (2009), which also includes equations for on-term and off-term House elec-
tions. The theory is that voters vote for the candidate who gives them the highest
expected utility, where utility may depend on their perception of the economy.
Under certain assumptions the linear equation that is estimated can be derived.
The equation will first be presented and then a few caveats mentioned.
The variables in the equation are listed in Table 1. The dependent variable is
the Democratic share of the two party vote. The vote share is used because there is
much more information in it regarding voting behavior than in simply a win/lose
variable. There are two output variables. G is the growth rate in the year of the
election, and Z picks up strong growth in any of the 15 quarters. The inflation
variable, P , is inflation over the entire 15 quarter period. The two incumbency
variables are DPER, a dummy variable that indicates whether the incumbent
president is running again, and DUR, a variable that measures how long a party
has been in the White House.
The dummy variable WAR pertains to the elections of 1920, 1944, and 1948,
where the economy was affected by World Wars I and II. The values of Z and
P are quite large in these periods, and they were set to zero—in other words,
dummied out. This results in a different constant term in the equation for these
three elections, which is what WAR is picking up.
The equation is estimated for the 1916–2016 period, 26 elections. The estimates
are in Table 2. The three economic variables are multiplied by I since the vote
share is the Democratic vote share. All three are significant. The estimates say that
for each percentage point increase in G the vote share increases by 0.673 points,
for each percentage point increase in P the vote share decreases by 0.721 points,
and for each new strong growth quarter the vote share increases by 0.792 points.
The person effect is 2.25 and the duration effect is -3.76. The estimated standard
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Table 1
Variables in Vote Equation
Variable Definition
V Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote.
I 1 if there is a Democratic presidential incumbent at the time of the
election and −1 if there is a Republican presidential incumbent.
G growth rate of real per capita GDP in the first three quarters of the
on-term election year (annual rate).
P absolute value of the growth rate of the GDP deflator in the first 15
quarters of the administration (annual rate) except for 1920, 1944,
and 1948, where the values are zero.
Z number of quarters in the first 15 quarters of the administration in
which the growth rate of real per capita GDP is greater than 3.2
percent at an annual rate except for 1920, 1944, and 1948, where
the values are zero.
DPER 1 if a Democratic presidential incumbent is running again, −1
if a Republican presidential incumbent is running again, and 0
otherwise.
DUR 0 if either party has been in the White House for one term, 1 [−1] if
the Democratic [Republican] party has been in the White House for
two consecutive terms, 1.25 [−1.25] if the Democratic [Republican]
party has been in the White House for three consecutive terms, 1.50
[−1.50] if the Democratic [Republican] party has been in the White
House for four consecutive terms, and so on.
WAR 1 for the elections of 1920, 1944, and 1948, and 0 otherwise.
• Sample period: 1916, 1920, . . . , 2016, 26 observations.
error is 2.95.
The ex post predictions are presented in Table 3 along with the data used in the
estimation. The largest error is for 1992, where the equation underpredicted the
votes for the Democrats (W. Clinton). The dependent variable is the share of the
two party vote. The 1992 error is much smaller if the third party Perot votes are




Dependent Variable is V
Base G
Eq. added
G · I 0.673 0.704
( 5.21) ( 5.63)
P · I −0.721 −0.681
(-2.19) (-2.16)
Z · I 0.792 0.695
( 3.01) ( 2.69)
DPER 2.25 0.74













No. obs. 26 26
See Table 1.
OLS; t-statistics in parentheses.
suggested that Perot took about equally from W. Clinton and G.H. Bush. The
equation also does not do well in 2016, where the Democrats (H. Clinton) did
much better than predicted and in fact won the popular vote. The landslides (say
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Table 3
Ex Post Predictions and Data
V̂ DP
V V̂ -V I G P Z -ER DUR
D 1916 51.7 51.3 -0.3 1 2.2 4.3 3 1 0.00
D 1920 36.1 40.1 3.9 1 -11.5 0.0 0 0 1.00
R 1924 41.7 44.0 2.3 -1 -3.9 5.2 10 -1 0.00
R 1928 41.2 43.1 1.8 -1 4.6 0.2 7 0 -1.00
R 1932 59.1 61.8 2.6 -1 -14.4 6.9 4 -1 -1.25
D 1936 62.2 63.7 1.5 1 11.6 2.5 9 1 0.00
D 1940 55.0 55.7 0.7 1 4.0 0.0 8 1 1.00
D 1944 53.8 51.8 -2.0 1 4.1 0.0 0 1 1.25
D 1948 52.3 50.4 -1.9 1 3.3 0.0 0 1 1.50
D 1952 44.7 46.2 1.5 1 1.0 2.4 7 0 1.75
R 1956 42.9 43.8 0.9 -1 -1.2 1.9 5 -1 0.00
R 1960 50.1 48.6 -1.4 -1 0.6 2.0 5 0 -1.00
D 1964 61.2 60.2 -1.0 1 5.1 1.2 9 1 0.00
D 1968 49.4 51.3 1.8 1 5.1 3.1 7 0 1.00
R 1972 38.2 42.0 3.7 -1 5.9 4.8 4 -1 0.00
R 1976 51.0 50.5 -0.6 -1 3.8 7.5 5 0 -1.00
D 1980 44.8 46.4 1.6 1 -3.6 7.8 5 1 0.00
R 1984 40.9 39.4 -1.5 -1 5.4 5.3 8 -1 0.00
R 1988 46.2 48.9 2.7 -1 2.3 2.8 4 0 -1.00
R 1992 53.6 48.2 -5.4 -1 3.1 3.2 3 -1 -1.25
D 1996 54.7 54.4 -0.3 1 3.3 2.0 4 1 0.00
D 2000 50.3 50.3 0.0 1 2.1 1.6 7 0 1.00
R 2004 48.8 44.1 -4.7 -1 2.1 2.1 2 -1 0.00
R 2008 53.7 53.1 -0.6 -1 -1.7 2.7 2 0 -1.00
D 2012 52.0 51.8 -0.2 1 1.1 1.4 2 1 0.00
D 2016 51.2 45.9 -5.3 1 1.2 1.4 2 0 1.00
MAE 1.9
• See Table 1.
• D or R: party in power at the time of the election.
• V̂ = ex post prediction of V from base equation in Table 2.
• MAE = mean absolute error.
•WAR is 1 in 1920, 1944, 1948 and 0 otherwise.
• The values of P for 1920, 1944, and 1948 before multiplication by
zero are 16.535, 5.478, and 8.718, respectively, and the values of Z
are 5, 14, and 5.
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vote share less than 43 percent or greater than 57 percent) are generally predicted
well. There are nine cases: 1920, 1924, 1928, 1932, 1936, 1956, 1964, 1972, and
1984. The mean absolute error (MAE) for these cases is 2.1. The overall MAE is
1.9.
An important caveat about this work is the danger of spurious correlation be-
cause of data mining. The lags were chosen for G and P because they gave the
best fit. Dummying out P and Z for the three war elections may be problematic.
Incrementing DUR in the way I did was on goodness of fit grounds. Finally, and
possibly most important, the variable Z was added after the 1992 election, and the
3.2 cutoff was chosen because it gave the best fit at the time. Z is a “good news”
variable in that it measures the number of quarters in the administration in which
the growth rate was noticeably strong. There is some evidence from psychology
experiments that people tend to remember extreme outcomes more than normal
ones, and Z can be considered to be a measure of extreme positive growth out-
comes. A “bad news” variable was also tried, but it was not significant in any of
the specifications.
In defense of this work, most of the results are robust to small changes in the
lags, cutoffs, and increments. The growth variable G has been significant with a
fairly stable coefficient estimate since the beginning of this work in 1976. The
specification of the equation has not changed since the changes after the 1992
election, so unchanged for 6 elections or 24 years! The only change is that the
equation is reestimaed with one extra observation after each election.
If the addition of Z is spurious in that it is mostly picking up the error in
1992, one would expect it would lose it significance for estimation periods that
end before 1992. When the equation is estimated only through the 1960 election
(1916–1960), 12 observations, 4 degrees of freedom, the coefficient estimates and
t-statistics for the economic variables are: G ·I: 0.818 (7.80), P ·I: -0.397 (-1.07),
Z · I: 0.736 (3.02). These estimates seem remarkably close to those in Table 2
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given the small sample size. In particular, Z is significant with a similar coefficient
estimate. Although Z was discovered only after the 1992 election, it could have
been discovered earlier by someone brighter.
3 Test of Risk-Aversion Voting
Before addingG to the equation, it is informative to look at some of the elections in
Table 3. If risk-aversion voting exists in addition to retrospective voting, one would
expect the equation, which only relies on retrospective voting, to underpredict the
vote share when the Democrats are in power and the economy is bad. The main
example is 1980, where the economy was bad and Carter lost, receiving only 44.8
percent of the two party vote. The equation predicted 46.4 percent, for an error of
1.6, predicted minus actual. According to risk-aversion voting the bad economy
should have been a plus for the Democrats, other things being equal, so since
the equation ignores risk-aversion voting the actual vote share should have been
larger than predicted (negative error term) when in fact it was smaller. The same
story holds for the 1920 election, although probably less weight should be put
on it because of the war. When the Democrats were in power and the economy
did well, they should have done worse than predicted (positive error terms). The
main examples are 1936, 1964, and 1968. They did worse than predicted in 1936
and 1968, but better in 1964. The errors in all these examples are fairly small.
These stories are just suggestive, but the results do not stand out as supporting
risk-aversion voting. The formal test is to added G, which is done in Table 2.
The coefficient estimate of G in Table 2 is not significant. Also, it is positive,
contrary to what risk-aversion voting would predict. The coefficient estimates of
the three economic variables do not change much. The coefficient estimate of
DPER fell from 2.25 to 0.74, although for neither equation is it significant. The
results thus do not support risk-aversion voting.
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PV arrived at their view by looking at the times between 1932 and 2012 in
which there was a switch of parties. There were 5 switches from R to D, 1932,
1960, 1976, 1992, and 2008, and 4 switches from D to R, 1952, 1968, 1980, 2000.
They find (PV, Table 5) significant results consistent with risk-aversion voting for R
to D, namely a bad economy hurts Republicans, but not from D to R. They attribute
the insignificant results for D to R to risk-aversion voting and retrospective voting
essentially cancelling each other out. A problem with this approach is that just
having a zero/one variable for elections discards useful information about voting
behavior. Take the election of 2000 for example. There was a switch from D to R,
but the election was very close and Gore actually got more votes that G.W. Bush.
In 1932 there was a switch from R to D, with Roosevelt getting 59.1 percent of the
two party vote, whereas there was also a switch from R to D in 1960 and 1976,
with Kennedy getting only 50.1 percent of the vote share and Carter getting only
51.0 percent. These differences in voting behavior are not captured by dummy
variables.
Finally, PV also argue that risk-aversion voting is supported by the fact that
stock returns and output growth do better under Democrats. The argument is that
Democrats tend to get voted in when the economy is weak (risk aversion high),
where stock returns and output growth then mean revert during the administra-
tion. This argument requires that the economy does in fact do better under the
Democrats. Regarding stock returns, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) examined
the period 1927–1998 and found significant differences between Democratic and
Republican administrations. PV extended the sample period to 1927–2015 and
also found significant differences. Regarding output growth, Blinder and Watson
(2016) examined the 16 administrations between Truman-2 and Obama-1. They
found that output growth and other measures of economic activity are significantly
higher under the Democrats. PV got similar results for the 1930–2015 period.
These results are, however, sensitive to adding more observations. In
Fair (2021) 5 observations were added, the elections of 1916, 1920, 1924, 1928,
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and 2020, and the mean differences between the two parties became insignificant.
Ten additional elections were also added, 1876—1912, with a similar conclusion.
There is little theory to suggest that stock returns and output growth should differ
between Democratic and Republican administrations, and the expanded results
support no significant differences.
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